Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1956

Robert L. Heywood v. The Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Co. : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Rawlings, Wallace, Roberts & Black; Wayne L. Black; Counsel for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Heywood v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., No. 8508 (Utah Supreme Court, 1956).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2587

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

<[..r~""o

Case No.-.see&-

r.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

UNIVERSITY: U1M

STATE OF UTAH

JAN281957
LAYi. UBBA!r'

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
By WAYNE L. BLACK,
Cownsel for Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE O:F CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT OF CASE ---------------···-·-···--------·-··-···----------·-···-···--· 1
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT -------------------------------·--·--------------· 1
THE FACTS -----------·····-·-·----------------·-··-------·---·-----------······---····----···· 2
STATEMENT OF POINTS---·------------·-··---·----·····················-·····-·· 11
POINT I. INSTRUCTION NO. 6 IS A CORRECT
STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND IS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANT. ------------------------------------------------ 12
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS SUBMISSION OF INSTRUCTION NO. 7 TO THE JURY. ____________ 25
POINT III. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS SUBMISSION OF INSTRUCTION NO. 8 TO THE JURY. __________ 28
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDiciAL ERROR BY REFUSING TO
GIVE DEFENDANTS REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1, 8, AND 11. --------------------------------------------------··
POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDIQAL ERROR BY REFUSING TO
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 6. --------········----------··········--····----------··-··--·--···-··-···---POINT VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICiA.L ERROR BY REFUSING TO
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2. ---·-----------------------------------------------------------------------POINT VII. THE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE AND
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WERE FOR THE
JURY: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AND
JUSTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
A DIRECTED VERDICT. ---··----------------------------------------------ARGUMENT -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------CONCLUSION ----------------------------------------------------------------------------··-·

·30

34

37

39
12
42

Authorities Cited
Allen v. Union Pacific R. Co., 7 Utah 239, 26 P. 297 ________________ 29
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Burkett (5th circuit 1951) 192
F. 2d 941 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 42
Atlantic Coastline Railroad Company v. Dixon, 189 F. 2d
525, (Cert. den. 342 U.S. 830, 72 Sup. Ct. 54, 96 L. Ed.
628) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~m.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
Bailey v. Centl'lal Vermont Ry. Inc., 319 U.S. 350, 63 S. Ct.
1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 41
Bailey v. Prime Western Spelter Co., 83 Kan. 230, 109 P.
791 ( 1910) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------Blew v. Atchinson T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (Mo. 1951), 245 S.W.
2d 31 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Brinkmeier v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 69 Kan. 738, 77
P. 586 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Brown v. Sharpholl!se Contracting Co., 159 ·Cal. 89, 112 P.
874 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Corn Products Refining Co. v. King, 168 Fed. 892 -------------------Denny v. Montour R. Co. (Penn. 1951), 101 F. Supp. 735 ________
Drew v. St. Louis-San Frandsco Ry. Co. (Mo. 1927), 293
s.w. 463 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------Ellis v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 329 U.S. 649, 67 S. Ct.
598, 91 L. Ed. 572 -----------·-------------------------------------------------------Glidewell v. Quincy, 0. & K. C. R. Co. (Mo. 1921), 236
s.w. 677 ·-···------------------------------------------------------------------------------Hatfield v. Thompson, 252 S.W. 2d 534 (Mo. 1952) ____________________
International & G.N.R. Co. v. Hawes (1899 Tex. Civ. App.),
54 s.w. 325' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------Joice v. Mi·ssouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. (Mo. 1945), 189 S.W.
2d 568, 161 A.L.R. 383 ··--·-··---------------------------------------------------Kamer v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 326 Mo. 792, 32
s.w. 2d 1075 (1930) ------------------------------------------···-···--------------Kaumans v. White Star Gas and Oil Co., 92 Utah 24, 32,
63 Pac. 2d 231 -----------------------------------------------------------------------Messing v. Judge & Dolph Drug Company, 322 Mo. 901,
18 s.w. 2d 408 (1929) -----------------------------------------------------------Midland Valley R. Go. v. Bell (1917) 155 C.G.A. 391, 242
Fed. 803 (Certiorari denied in (1917), 245 U.S. 653,
62 L. Ed· 532, 38 S. Ct. 12) ---------------------------------------------------Missouri Pacific Railroad ,co. v. Burks, 196 Ark. 1104, 121
s.w. 2d 65 -------·········---------------··-···-·······-----···--------------------------Moore v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company,
4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P. 2d 849 (195'6) ....................................

32
25

32
29
29
14
14
25

19
24
:39
31
22
32
21

39

17
38

Moore v. Miles, 108 Utah 167, 158 P. 2d 676 ·-··-·······---------------- 32
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE O:F CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
New Deemer Mfg. Co. v. Wells, 296 Fed. 687 ---------------------------- 29
Perry v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. (Mo. 1937), 104 S.W.
2d 332 -----------------------------------------------------------·-----------·-----------·---· 23
Pollard v. Gammon (Ga. 1940), 63 Ga. App. 852, 12 S.E.
2d 624 -----------------------------------------------------------·---------------------------- 38
Port of New York Stevedoring Corporation v. Castagna, 280
Fed. 618 --------------------------···-------------------------------------------·----------- 29
Pritt v. West Virginia N. R. Co. (W. Va.) 51 S.E. 2d 105,
6 A.L.R. 2d 562 ---------------------------------------------------·-------------·------ 25
Rothwell v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 87 F. Supp. 706 (1950) ________ 25
Schlatter v. MoCarthy (1948), 113 Utah 543, 196 P. 2d
968 ---------------·---------------------------------------··----------------------·---------·---Schirra v. Delaware L. & W.R. Co. (Penn. 1952), 103 F.
Supp. 812 -------------------------------------------------------·-------------------------Schonlau v. 'Terminal R. A,ss'n of St. Louis, 357 Mo. 1108,
212 s.w. 2d 420 (1948) ---------------·---------------·-------·---------------Seaboard Airline Railway v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492, 34 Sup.
Ct. 638, 585' L. Ed. 1062 ( 1914) -------------------------------------------Solomon R. Co. v. Jones, 30 Kan. 601, 2 P. 657; In re California Nav. & Imp. Co., 110 Fed. 670 -------------------------------Southern Pacific Company v. Guthrie (9th Circuit 1949) 180
F. 2d 295 -----------·--------·--------------·---------------------------·-------------------S. S. Kresge Co. v. McCallion (Eighth Circuit, 1932), 58
F. 2d 931 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------·
Stevens v. Mirakian, 177 Va. 123, 12 S.E. 2d 780 ____________________

28
18
23
17
29
42
18
17

Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468,
23 S. Ct. 622, 47 L. Ed. 905 ----------·--------------------------------------- 38
Thomas v. Union Railway Company (6th Circuit 1954), 216
F. 2d 18 ---------------------------·-------------------------------------------------------- 42
Thomson v. Boles, 123 F. (2d) 487, 492 (8 C.C.A. 1941) __________ 33
Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Hadley, 246 U.S. 330, 332, 38
S. Ct. 318, 319, 62 L. Ed. 751 ------------------------------------------------ 15
Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 69 S. Ct. 413, 93 L. Ed.
497 -------------------------------------·--------------··------------------------------------·--- 41
Williams v. Atlantic Coast LineR. Co., 190 F. 2d 744 ________________ 25

Text Cited
68 ALR 1400, 1445 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 39

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

Respondent,
vs.
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
vVESTERN RAILROAD COMp AN"Y, a corporation,

Case No.
8505

Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

PRELIMINARY

STATE~IENT

The parties will be referred to as in the Court below.
All italics are ours.
Defendant's brief contains .a State1nent of Facts
which is neither complete nor in many respeets accurate.
We, therefore, deen1 it necessary to restate the facts of
the case.
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B.

THEFACTS

Plaintiff Robert L. Heywood was 63 years of age at
the time of trial. He had spent the mature years of his
life as a machinist having first hired out for the Southern
Pacific Company in the year 1911. He had worked as a
machinist for defendant frmn N ovmnber :2, 1922 to the
date of his injury on November 23, 1953. His work consisted of running machines, .assen1bling machines, engines
and parts and umchining parts (R. 1-!). During the
nwnth of Novernber, 1953, his particular assignment was
that of a general handy n1an under the supervision of
diesel foreman, Paul Schenk.
On the uwrning of the oceurrence Heywood was as:-;igned by Schenk to take up a steam leak on a single arch
steam hammer located at the blacksmith shop (R. 16, 59).
A single arch stemn hannner is a rnechanisrn whose
purpose is the fashioning of large pieces of rnetal into
various sizes and shapes. The ~temn con1es frmn the
power hou.se which is located approxilnately one block
fron1 the blacksmith shop. The pressure .at which the
stemn is n~nall~· kept i8 :2:'>0 pounds. Boiler pops are
located on the boiler whieh relieYe the pressure if it
reaches a higher amount (R. 19, :20). During Xove1nher
of 1953, the pressure maintained on the stearn lines in
the blacksrnith shop \Ya~ kept at varying anwunts. HowP,Ver, the minirnurn anwunt observed on the dials by the
plaintiff \\'a~ :200 pounds (H. :21 ). The ~tean1leak ~elwnk
had assigned IIPy\\'ood to repair on the 1norning of
~O\'Pml>Pr :2:~, 1D:l:~, \\'<1~ in tlw stuffing box. The stuffing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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box i~ located approxinmtel~- ten to hYelve feet from
the ground '"here tit<' ~team pipe come~ from tlw
steam line and goes into the stuffing box. A shn1off valve is located approximate!~, two feet from
the stuffing box out along the steaJn line (R. 21). The
purpose of the stuffing box is to provide a flexible joint
so that the vibration of the hammer will not break the
pipe at the threads. On the end of the pipe which goes
into the stuffing box is a collar. The pipe is placed inside
the box. Sever.al rings of packing are placed in the box
around the pipe and against the collar and the gland is
then tightened by four nuts, leaving approximately onehalf inch of packing between the collar and the gland (R.
22). If a leak develops it c.an frequently be corrected by
simply tightening the gland. Sometimes it is necessary
to replace smne of the packing. If the packing is soft,
generally one ring is replaced. If it is hard it may be
necessary to replace rnore than one ring (R. 25, 26). On
the occasion in question when plaintiff approached the
stuffing box he observed that steam was leaking frmn the
box and the gland was down tight. He knew he would
have to place n10re packing in the box. He placed a
ladder against the single arch hammer in the a pproximate position shown on Exhibit 2, clirnbed the ladder and
turned off the vain" near the stuffing box (R. 49, 50, 54,
;)5). After he had turned off the valve, he took the gland
off the box, slid it hack along the pipe and took out one
ring of packing. He needed 16-inch packing. Schenk gavp
him .a piece of seven inch square packing and he advised
Hchenk that

thi~ wa~

not the right :;:ize. EvE>ntufll1;.T he
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found a proper size of packing at the power house, took
it back and put it in the stuffing box around the pipe (R.
'27 -29). Plaintiff testified that he performed this task in
the usual and normal ·way. He replaced the gland and
tightened it to what he thought was the proper tension.
He then reached up and opened the valve. At the time he
opened the valve, he was on the ladder with his feet approximately six feet off the ground. He testified, "A.
Well, I turned the valve, and I hadn't come down one step
before the steam pipe blew straight out in my face, and
as it came out it hit me on the hand here." (R. 30). He
fell from the ladder and landed on the floor in a standing
position with his weight on the left leg (R. 30). In order
for the pipe to have come out of the gland, it would have
been necessary for it to break away fron1 the collar (R.
67 -68).
Defense witness J a1nes Everett A_berton, Division
Locmnotive Fore1nan, arrived shortly after the accident
and observed the pipe that had blo"\\"'11 loose from the
joint. In his opinion, the pipe at the collar had been
broken prior to the tune it gave way except for about
three-eighths of an inch which apparently had given way
suddenly when the pipe can1e out of the stuffing box (R.
136-1~~8).

Crowton, a pipefitter \Yith ~i7 year~ of experience
who testified for plaintiff, stated that the pipe involved
ap]wared to be ~ingle ~trength. If it had once been doublr
strength, the ~team cutting away at the interior had
thinned out the pipe until it had the appearance of single
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strength (R. 114). lie observed the break in the pipe
near the collar and testified that the fresh bre.ak as distinguished from the older break was approximately fiveeighths of an inch in length (R. 111). See also Aberton's
testimony at record 146.
There is a distinction between the work of a machinist and a pipefitter. A pipefitter does all work on pipes
including re1nov.al and repair. A machinist works on
machines or mechanisms but not on pipes. The foreman,
in this instance Schenk, determines whether the machinist
or the pipefitter is to do the ViTork. If Schenk had desirerl
to have the pipe inspected on thif' occasion he would have
had Heywood get the mechanism ready for removal of tlw
pipe and .a pipefitter renwve the pipe (R. 15, 79, 85, 98).
That the foregoing facts were not in dispute is seen from
the testimony of Aberton. He stated:

"Q.

The job of renwving the packing and replacing the packing, is the job of a machinist, such
as Mr. Heywood was 1

A.

To remove the packing1

Q.

Yes; and replace it 1

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

But if the pipe has to be removed, the foreman instructf; the pipefitter to remove it,
doesn't he"!

A.

Yes.

Q.

And the foreman determines whether the pipe
is to be remOl:ed, does he not, in the first instance?
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A.

Yes sir." (R. 145).

Urowton testified to the same effect (R. 109).
Heywood testified that if an inspection were to be
1nade of the interior of the steam box and the condition
of the collar and pipe within the steam box, this would
be a matter for the supervisor to detern1ine and not for
hin1 (R. !)7, 69, 79, 85).
Schenk testified that the rea8on he went and looked
at the 1nachine after being notified of the leak was so
that he could detennine whether to send a 1nachinist or
a pipefitter to repair the leak. He testified:

"'Q.

Why did you go to look it over and see what
was the 1natter with it~

.\.

So I could notify the u1an about going out
and 1naking repairs.

ll. That u·as so you could determiue whether or
not to send a pipefitter o11f, or just a machinist, isn't that right?

A.

In a way, yes.

Q.

And you detennined, at that ti1ne, the fellow
that ~hould go out slionld be a 1nachinist -~

~\.

Correct.

Q.

You didn't have in n1ind any pipes would have
to be re1noved, did you-~

A.

No.

<l. \'on concluded, frmn looking at it, that all it
needed wa8 that packing put in there?
.\.

That is right (H. 1:l:).15±).
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He further testified that he made no arrangeinents
at any time to shut the stemn off the line at the intermediate valve (R. 154.)
Heywood testified that only two things could cause
a leak, either the need for new packing, or a broken pipe
(R. 45).
Aberton was in cmnplete aceord on this proposition
(R. 138, 146).
Plaintiff testified that in removing and replaeing the
packing in the stuffing box, he would not have an opportunity to see the end of the pipe with the collar on it or
have determined the condition of the collar. An inspection could not be 1nade without re1noving the pipe frmn
the stuffing box.
He further testified that one of the reasons he
couldn't see in the stuffing box or make an inspeetion as
to the condition of things in the stuffing box w.as the
steam. He stated that the condition of the valves generally in the shop and of this valve in particular, was such
that there was always a certain amount of steam escaping
even though the valve was shut off as tightly as was possible. The result was that when he was working at the
stuffing box some steam was coming out of the box (R.
::32, 59, 64).
Aberton also testified that the joint in the stuffing
box was concealed and could not have been inspected
without opening the box and getting into it (R. 138, 146).
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Schenk rnade an inspection of the leak at the hammer
before he assigned Heywood to repair the leak. He is the
one who had the responsibility of determining whether to
remove and inspect the pipe. He decided against this procedure (R. 151).
:B~urthernwre,

Schenk wa:S at the hmmuer at the time
the work by plaintiff was under way when he brought
plaintiff the seven-eighths-inch square packing which
plaintiff could not use. Plaintiff testified:

"Q. Did he ever tell you to take the piping out .at
that time~
A.

No, sir.

Q.

Did he ever tell you to inspect that

A.

No, sir." (R. 79)

flange~

Plaintiff had worked rnany year8 in and around the
blacksmith shop under the supervision of various forernen. He had always used the valve next to the stuffing
box on this particular n1achine and he didn't know of the
existence of the so-called intennediate valYe in the middle
of the blacksrnith shop (R. 51, 75, 76).
Griffith on the other hand testified that the so-called
interrnediate valve in the center of the shop was the usual
and custmnary place where stemn was turned off when
the hamrner ·was going to be shut down for the type of
repair being done by Heywood at the tin1e of his injury.
He also h'~ti l'it>d that turning off the stemn is a pipefitters work and that it wa~ n~nal for a pipefitter to turn
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the stean1 off when work similar to that being done by
Heywood was done (R. 93, 98).
Alberton also testified it ""as the practice and custom
to turn off the intermediate valve when repairs were
made on the stuffing box (R. 138).
Schenk tt>stified concerning practice and custom
(R. 150):

"A. I notify the machinist to make the repair, and
then the practice is, when the machinist goes
out there, when he is free to go out there and
do the job, he notifies me about it, and I get
a pipe fitter to prepare the work. We have an
intermediate valve which is shut off-necessary to shut this off, so the man can work with
security on the job. This is considered a pipefitter's job, and we-I instntct the pipefitter
to shut that valve off.
Q. You are referring to the interinediate valve~
A.

The intennediate valve. That is not the valve
at the stemn hammer."
It will be recalled that Schenk inspected the leak at
the hammer on the morning of the accident, instructed
plaintiff as to his work, and was later at the hammer
when plaintiff was seeking the right size of packing. At
no time did he request a pipefitter or anyone else to turn
off the intermediate valve (R. 28, 59, 151, 154).
Crowton testified that if work w.as being done on the
single arch hammer, the shut off valve which was used
by the plaintiff was the one generally used. He stated
that the shut-off valve in the middle of the blacksmith
shop would be used if there was some leak or defect be-
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tween that valve and the valve near the hammer. If some
repair had to be made at that hammer or beyond the
valve near the hammer, the valve near the hmnmer would
be the one used (R. 106).
Crowton testified that the piping and fittings, with
the exception of some pipes which had been broken or
worn out and replaced, had been in the blacksmith shop
since 1923 or 1924, and that the railroad had no practice
of inspecting the fittings or the piping to determine
whether any should be renewed (R. 100).
He testified that pipes which have steam pressure in
them deteriorate from the inside, making them thinner
but there is little, if any, deterioration from the outside.
With respect to joints that are threaded, he testified that
if a collar is 1nachined rather than threaded on the pipe
the area will not be as weak and will not be as likely to
give way. The collar on the pipe in this case was threaded
rather than machined and the break oceurred in the first
thread. In his experience this was always the place where
pipe would give way first. He further stated that with
the passage of time in the blaeks1nith shop, leaks in the
piping had becmne rnore and nwre frequent (R. 101, 102).
Plaintiff testified that the pressure in these steam
lines wa.s always too high. On occasions prior to his injury, he had co1nplained about the mnount of pressure in
the lines to Schenk and Alwrton (R. 3:2). H,, nmde the~,,
cmnplaints ahnost every tin1e he was sent to repair stea1n
leaks in the blacks1nith shop (R. 32).
Smneti1ne prior to plaintiff's injuries, there had
been reducing valves on the stemn lines into the blackSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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smith shop. These reducing valves had either become inoperative or had been rPmoved. Crowton testified that tlw
reducing valves would have kept the pressure down below·
a certain maximum and would have prevented excess
pressure (R. 105).
Plaintiff testified that a pressure of 135 pounds was
adequate for operation of the 1nachines in the blacksmith
shop. The 200 pound minimum pressure maintained in
the blacksmith shop was unnecessary and the reducing or
regulating valves would have corrected the excess pressure (R. 38).
Crowton also testified that pipes in the blacks1nith
shop are old and that there was always danger of pipe
blowing up (R. 33). He further testified that there was
a type of shut-off valve consisting of a wheel .and chain
reaching to the floor which could have been used on this
particular line and which would have prevented the necessity of getting up on the ladder near the, stuffing box in
order to turn the valve, and that this type of valve would
have been safer because a workman wouldn't have been
required to get up near the steam pressure in order to
turn the valve off and on (R. 34).
STATI1Jl\lENT OF

POINT~

POINT I
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 IS A ·CORRECT STATEMENT OF
THE LAW AND IS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANT.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS SUBMISSION OF
STRUCTION NO. 7 TO THE JURY.

IN-
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POINT III
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS SUBMISSION OF INSTRUCTION NO. 8 TO THE JURY.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR BY REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1, 8 AND 11.
POINT V
THE TRIAL ·COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR BY REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 6.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL ·COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR BY REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2.
POINT VII
THE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE WERE FOR THE JURY: THE TRIAL COURT
CORRECTLY AND JUSTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.

POINT I
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 IS A ·CORRECT STATE-:\IENT OF
THE LAW AND IS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANT .

. \naly~i~ of Instruction Xo. 6 clear!~· reveals that
a~ C'ontenderl hy defendant, a mandator~- in8truC'-

it is not,
tion.
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At the outset the jtu~, is advised that defendant
is liable only for a failure to exercise reasonable care
to provide its employees with a re,asonably safe place
to; work. The jury is further advised that this does
not require the absolute elimination of all danger, but
only those dangert-> which the exercise of reasonable
care would remove or guard against. Applying those
general principles to the case, the court ins,tructs the
jury that it they find from a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff at the time of his injury was performing the duties of his entplyoment and that defendant
failed to exercise reasonable care to make said place
reasonably safe for the performance of such duties,
liability would attach. By use of the words "in that"
objected to by defendant an added limitation is imposed.
The jury is told that said unsafety must be confined to
the position of the plaintiff in connection with his duties
and the oper.ation of appliances used in the performance
of his duties, and further that his position and the
operation of the appliances "were such that the plaintiff
was not performing his duties in a place of reasonable
safety." It is difficult for us to im-agine an instruction
more confining .and nwre limited in its terms. Our position is that said instruction was unduly and unnecessarily favorable to the defendant because it did not
allow the jury to consider all surrounding circumstanres
in determining whether plaintiff's place of work was
reasonably s.afe. For example, the amount of steam
pressure in the liner-; and the general deterioration of
the piping in the round house were removed frmn tlt<·
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jury's consideration by the overrestrictive language of
the instruction. Also removed from the jury's consideration was the conduct of foreman Schenk in not requiring
that the pipe be removed and inspected before having
plaintiff replace the packing. The jury should have
been allowed to consider fore1nan Schenk's conduct in
detennining whether defendant had exercised reasonable
care in furnishing plaintiff a reasonably safe place in
which to work. In Denny r. lJf ontmtr R. C!J. (Penn.
t951) 101 F. Supp 735, the court stated:
"The rule which requires the railroad to
furnish its employees with a reasonably safe
place to work does not have reference only to
the physical condition of the place itself but also
has reference to the negligent acts of the fellow
employees. Bailey v. Central Vennont Ry. Inc.,
319 U.S. 350, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1-!4-± ~
Griswold v. Gardner, 7 Cir., 155 F. 2d 333."
However, defendant is in no position to con1plain
about .an instruction that i1uposed on plaintiff as the
prevailing party, a greater burden than the law required.
See Drew u. St. Lou is-Sa11 Francisco Ry. Co. (:Missouri
1927) 293 s.w. -!63.
Defendant .in its brief at pagt> 16,

~tates:

'"This eharge plaees the whole e1uphasis on
whether the place of work 'Yas safe, rather than
whether defendant failed to exercise reasonable
care."
rl,hat such i~ not the faet ean best be detenuined
by reference to tla~ nu1nber of oe{'asions in the instruction where the trial c.ourt n~e~ the words negligence,
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reasonable care, reasonably safe place to work .and
reasonable safety. It i~ also significant that the jury is
only told that they may find defendant negligent, not
that they m'Ltst find negligence. In .addition, the interpretation of said instruction n1ust be considered in the
light of the other instru0tions given. In this connection
we call attention to the staternent of Mr. Justice Holmes
in lTnion Pacific R.R. Co. r. Hadley, 246 LT.S. 330, 332,
:~.~ S. Ct. 318, 319, 6~ L. Ed. 751 :
"On the question of its negligence, the defendant undertook to split up the charge into
items mentioned in the dedaration as constituent
elements and to ask a ruling as to e.ach. But the
whole may be greater than the sum of its parts,
and the court was justified in leaving the general
question to the jury if it thought that the defendant should not be allowed to take the bundle
apart and break the sticks separately, and if the
defendants' conduet viewed as a whole warranted
a finding of neglect."
Throughout the instructions are found constant references to the requirement of a finding of negligence
before liability will attaeh. Jnstruction No. 1 in part
reads as follows :
"He specifically alleges that the defendant
was negligent in failing to use reasonable care
to furnish plaintiff .a re~asonable safe place to
work in that he was directed to repair a steam
leak from such a position and in such a proximit.\~
to the stean1 controls, that he was unable to safely
perfonn the duties of his employn1ent ;..
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Instruction No. 2 in stating the general principles
of law governing the c.ase, quotes from the Federal
Employers' Lia;bility Act as follows:

"**** shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury ***** resulting in whole or
,in part from the negligence of any of the employees of such carrier."
Instruction
eare.

~o.

3 defines negligence and ordinary

Instruction ~ o. 5 states that an employer is liable
for negligent acts or omissions of an einployee.
Instruction No. 11, reads as follows:
"You are instructed that the railroad is not
required to keep its shops equipped with new
and modern equipment and that the mere fact
that equipment may be old and used is not in
and of itself sufficient evidence to prove negligence on the p.art of the defendant railroad.''
Instruction No. 12 advises the jury how to apportion any recovery for the respective negligence of plaintiff and defendant. Instruction X o. 13, the dmnage instruction, also uses the words "a~ a proxilnate result
of defendant's negligence .. ,
It is difficult to eonceive how a trial court could
devise nwre way8 and 1neans of reiterating that liabilitv
will only attach upon a finding of defendant's failure
to exercise ordinary care.

The CJases cited hy defendant are distinguishable.
In Seaboard Airline 1-lailway r. Horton. ~3:~ 1T.S. -t9~.
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34 Sup. Ct. 638, 585 L. Ed. 1062, (1914), the trial court
gave a clearly mandatory instruction. A mere recital
of the instruction condemned in that case should demonstrate the distinction between said instruction and the
one given in the case at bar.
"*** If you further find from the evidence
that the guard was a proper safety provision for
the use of that guage and that it was unsafe without it, then the defendant did not furnish him a
safe place and s.afe appliance to do his work,
and if it remained in that condition, it was continuing negligence.****"
In Instruction No. 6 the jury is told:
"If you ... find ... that ... defendant failed
to exercise reasonable care to make said place
reasonably safe ... you may find the defendant
negligent ... "
The sarne mandatory provisions of the I-Iorton cm~t'
appear in the next case cited by defendant. Atlantic
Coastline Railroad ComJmny v. Dixon 189 F. 2d 525,
(Cert. den. 342 U.S. 830, 72 Sup. Ct. 54, 96 L. Ed. 628).
The jury was instructed as a matter of law that if
the place of work was unsafe, defendant was liable.
Reasonable care and negligence were foreign to tlw
instruction given. In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. r.
Burks, 196 Ark. 1104, 121 S.W. 2d 65, the jury \Va~
instructed as a matter of law that if the floor of the
freight car w.as unsafe, defendants were negligent. Liability of the defendant was not made contingent on a
showing of negligence. In Stevens v. Mirakian, 177 Ya.
123, 12 S.E. 2d 780, it was held that the jury should
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have been instructed that defendant knew or in the
exercise of ordinary care should have kno"\Vll of the
defective condition of the chair before defendant could
be found negligent. This was not a xnaster-servant case
and the basis of liability was not failure to exercise
ordinary care to furnish a reasonably safe place to work.
Likewise it was not a case in which the evidence was
undisputed as to the nature and extent of knowledge
possessed by defendant as is the case here.
It will be observed that Instruction Xo. 6 uses the
words "reasonable safety." The word reasonable is
variously defined as ''exercising sound judgment" or
sensibly restrained or te1nperate." Thus it can be seen
that the degree of safety rec1uired by the instruction is
not absolute but qualified by reasonableness, and limited
to the exercise of ordinary ~are on the part of defendant.
In 8. 8. Kresge Co. u. JlrCallion, (Eighth Circuit.
193.2) 58 F. 2d 931, the Court stated:
'' [t is not difficult to destroy ahnost any
eharge by isolating certain limited expressionf;
therein, but the charge n1ust be c.onsidered as a
whole with the view of detennining the nnpression conveyed thereby to the jury. TFe cannot
think the jury could hare listened to this rhar.rJ<'.
1rhich again and again spoke of negligence and of
care, and therefrom hare gotten an impressiou
that negligence was no pa'rt of the issue, and that
no Inatter how careful appellant might have been
it was liable."
In Schirra r. J)elaware L. ~ JF. R. Co., (Penn. 195~)
103 F. Supp R1 ~' the ('Onrt upheld instructions similar
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to those given in the case at bar. See also Glidewell r.
Quincy, 0. & K. C. R. Co., (Mo. 1921) 236 S.W. 677.
Defendant eon1plains that Instruction No. 6 is erroneous because it fail~ to specifically require the jury
to find that defendant rail road emnpany knew or should
have known of a condition which exposed plaintiff to an
unreasonable risk of harm. Our answer to this claim j ~
two-fold. First the requirentent that the jury rnust find
defendant railroad cmnpany failed to exercise reasonable
care to furnish plaintiff with a reasonably safe place
in which to work, incorporates within it by necessan~
inference, the proposition that the railroad company
knew, or should have known of a condition which subjected plaintiff to .an unreasonable risk of harrn. It if:
obvious that under the general instruction defining negligence the jury could not have found that defendant failed
to do what an ordinary person would have done lill{kr
the circumstances unless they also found that defendant
had knowledge of a condition subjecting its employees
to an unreasonable risk of harrn. Secondly, under the
facts of the case, knowledge on the part of defendant
cmnpany was not a disputed issue. The defendant company conceded that the break in the pipe was old and
consequently diseoverable hy an inspection consisting
of removal of the pipe fron1 the stuffing box.
At page 8 of defendant's brief appears the following
statement:
"1\fr. Aberton found that there was an old
break between the collar and the pipe all the way
around the pipe except for approximately :;~'
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(Record 37) He was able to determine that the
break was old because of discoloration (Record
156). He stated that it was his opinion that there
was just a thread holding the pipe to the collar
at the time Mr. Heywood was performing hi::;
work (Record 137, 138)."
Counsel then quotes at page 9 from the testimony
of witness Crowton to the same effect. Likewise, it was
undisputed that said break could not have been discovered without removing the pipe from the stuffing
box. We again quote from page 14 of defendant's brief:
"The break in the pipe was one which could
not have been detected without ren1oving thP
pipe."
Furthermore, it was undisputed that only two things
could have caused the leak in the stuffing box, either
a break in the pipe within the stuffing box, or loo:-;p
packing. If it was a break in the pipe, it would be a
job for the pipefitter to perfonn. If it was loose packing,
it would be a job for the n1achinist. It was fore1nan
Schenk's responsihilit~· to detennine whether a 1nachinist
or a pipefitter should perfonn the work. He decided
to have Heywood, the nmehinist, replace the packing,
and the effect of this decision \Yas that the pipe w-as not
re1noved frmn the stuffing hox and was not inspected.
Defendant's hopeless effort to place responsibility for
the decision not to renwn' the pipe on the shoulders
of :Heywood i~ contnu~· to the undisputed testimony
0 r defendant's own witne~se~. i-\berton testified:

"Q. And the foreman detern1ines whether thP
pipe is to be removed does he not in the first
instance~
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~\.

Yes, sir," (R. 145).

And Schenk, the foreman, testified:

·•Q.

A.

That was so you could determine whether or
not to send a pipefitter out, or just a
machinist, isn't that right?
In a way, yes." (R. 153).

And again:

"Q. You concluded, from looking at it, that all
it needed was that packing put in there?
A.

That is right." (R. 154).

rrhe facts being undisputed, the only question for
the jury was whether in view of the undisputed facts,
defendant failed to exercise reasonable c.are to furnish
plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which to work.
That issue vvas properly submitted to the jury by the
trial eourt's instructions.
An analysis of a serie;-; of Missouri cases demonsh·.ates the soundness of plaintiff's position:
In J1 essin.fJ v. Judge & Dolph Dntg Company, 322
~Io. 901, 18 S.W. 2d 408, (1929), the court discussed
an instruction similar to Instruction No. 6 and st,ated:
"The most serious complaint urged by appellant against the instruction is that it fails to require the jury to find that the defendant knew,
or by the exercise of ordinary care could have
known, of the unsafe condition of plaintiff's place
of work. The instruction, however, requires the
jury to find, as a necessary prerequisite to a
~erdict in favor of plaintiff, that 'in thus furn-
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ishing and providing said place of work, **** tlw
defendant failed to use ordinary care and was
guilty of negligence.' It has been repeatedly and
consistently ruled by this court that a finding of
negligence imports knowledge (on the part of
the party found to have been negligent) of the
unsafe condition of the appliance, or of the place
of work. An allegation, or a finding, that a defendant negligently caused or permitted an unsafe
described condition is equivalent to an allegation,
or a finding, that a defendant knew the condition
to exist. The reason for the foregoing uniform
holding is readily apparent, for it is obvious that
the jury could not well have found that the defendant was negligent in furnishing the plaintiff
with an unsafe place in which to work without
believing (and inferentially finding) that defendant knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care
could have known, of the unsafe condition of
the place of work."
The :Messing case was follmn•d in a nu1nber of later
Missouri cases. In J(mner r. Ill issouri-I\ ansas-Te:ra~ R.
Co. 326 :Mo.

79~.

3:2 S.,Y. 2d 107;) (1930). the rourt

stated:
"The instruction does not, in express words,
require a finding that defendant knew or in the
exercise of ordinarY care eould haYe known that
plaintiff was betwe.en cars: but. we do not think
it must be held erroneous on that account. The
finding that defendant under the circmnstance~
was not in the exercise of ordinary care, and wa~
guilty of negligence, is equivalent to a finding
that defendant knew or in the exercise of ordinarY
care could have known plaintiff wa~ between th~
ears. (Citing eases).··
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The :Messing case and the J{ame r ea~P were upheld
in Perry v. Missouri-Kansas-Tel'as R. Co. (:Missouri
1937) 104 S.W. 2d 332.
The Supre1ne Court of :Missouri had occasion to
elaborate upon the doctrine of the ~Iessing case in
8chonlau v. Tenninal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 357 Mo.
1108, 212 S.W. 2d 420 (1948). In that case a baggage
handler ''Tas injured allegedly because of a bmnpy condition of a sub-basement floor. The trial court in its
instruetions did not require a specific finding that the
railroad cmnpany knew, or should have known, of the condition of the floor, but submitted the case on general
instructions pertaining to negligence. Defense counsel
urged the appellate court to reappraise and reconsider
the doctrine pronounced in the :Messing ,case. The court
~tated:

"Defendant urges that we should re-examine
that doctrine. Perhaps, if the circumstances of
this case were otherwise, it would be well to do
so, and, in the future, to limit its applic:ation only
to those instances, in which we are satisfied the
jury, in making all the findings required by an
instruction in order to reach the requested verdict,
could not do so unless it also found defendant had
sufficient knowledge of the unsafe condition complained of.
However, in the instant case we are s:atisfied
from the requirements contained in plaintiff's
instruction that the jury had to find, inferentially
at least, that defendant had sufficient knowledge
of the unsafe condition. The instruction required,
as we have pointed out, the jury to find that the
place of work was unsafe because the flooring
was old and rough, and that defendant furnished
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the place of work in such a condition, and that
by doing so defendant was negligent. Thus the
jury had to find defendant knew of such condition
for some time before it could return a verdict for
plaintiff under the instruction. We find no error
in this instruction under the particular circumstances of this case."
One of the cases relied upon by defendant in its
brief is Hatfield '1/. Thompson, 252 S.\Y. 2d 534, (~[iE
souri 1952) where the Supreme Court discussed the
l\fessing, Kamer and Schonlau cases. In the Hatfield
case the plaintiff, a conductor, while attempting to board
a moving train, allegedly slipped in a hole in defendant'~
right of way. The most hotly disputed issue of the case
had to do with whether the r.ailroad company had knowledge of the hole in the right of way. The trial court's
instructions allowed the jury to find from the mere
existence of the hole that the defendant was negligent
without requiring a finding of prior knowledge of the
existence of the hole by the railroad company. The
Missouri Supreme Court held that this was error anrl
pointed out the distinction between the situation existing
in the Hatfield case and that in the Schonlau ca8e. Tlw
court stated :

"It is the law that 'vhere the defect is of
such a nature that the finding of its existence
carries with it the clear inference of knowledge
of defendant of its prior existence, an instruction omitting such a finding cannot be said to
be prejudicially erroneous. Schonlau Y. Tenninal
R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 357 ~fo. 1108, 1116-111 S.
212 S.W. 2d --l-:20, 4:2-t. --l-:25. But, as stated, no
such inference arises in this case. The hole here
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involved could e.asily and quickly be made by
any number of agencies other than that of defendant's workmen."
The facts of the case at bar bring it within the
Schonlau rather than the Hatfield case. The jury was
required to find in the Schonlau case that the flooring
was old .and rough. In the case at bar the break in the
pipe was old and rusted and consequently discoverable
by inspection according to the undisputed evidence. On
the other hand, in the Hatfield case the length of time
the hole in the right of way had existed and whether the
defendant could have acquired prior knowledge of its
existence were hotly disputed and .an instruction on
prior knowledge was held by the court to be necessary
to prevent misunderstanding by the jury. In the case
at bar the facts pertaining to knowledge being undisputed, the only issue was whether the jury should draw
an inference of negligence. Inferences from uncontroverted, as well as controverted facts, are questions for
the jury. See Ellis 1:. TTnion Pacific R.R. Co., 329 U.S.
649, 67 S. Ct. 598, 91 L. Ed. 572.
Other ca.ses support plaintiff's position. Blew v.
Atchinson T. & S.F. Ry. Co., (:Mo. 1951) 245 S.W. :Zd
31, Rotlnrell v. Pennsyl V(( nia R. Co., 87 F. Supp. 706

(1950). Williams 1'. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 190 F.
2d 744. Pritt v. West Virgi11ia Y. R. Co. (W.Va.) 51
S.E. 2d 105, 6 A. L. R. 2d 562.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS SUBMISSION OF INSTRUCTION NO. 7 TO THE JURY.
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Instruction No. 7 authorizes the jury to find that
it was the custmn and practice of defendant eornpany
to shut off the steam at the intermediate valve and to
further find that failure of defendant to shut off the
intermediate valve was negligence which proximately
caused injuries to plaintiff. Defendant makes the following statement in his brief at page 23:
"There was no evidence offered or rec-eived
at the trial proving or tending to prove that it
was the custom and practice or duty of the defendant company, under the circumstanc-es, to
shut off the steam at the intermediate valve
through an employee other than plaintiff.'~
The foregoing statement is incorrect. Griffiths
fied as follows:

te~ti

"Q. And do vou have a custom and rule which
requires that steamfitters turn the stean1 off
at a major valve like that prior to the time
that they work on a piece of equipment like
this where it's going to be shut do-w-n for
some time~
A.

Well, that work of turning the steam i11
your steamfitting and so on is generall~T considered pipefitter's work.

Q. And is it usual for the pipefitters to turn
the stean1 off or have it turned off when work
like this is done 1
A.

Yes." (R. 93)

Aberton testified to the same effect.
"A.

The practice is to turn off the inter1nediate
valve before you make any repairs on the
stuffing box at these hmnmers." (R. 138)
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Schenk also testified to the S'aine effect.

"A. I notify the machinist to make a rep;air, and
then the practice is, when the machinist goes
out there, when he is free to go out there
and do the job, he notifies me about it, and
I get a pipefitter to prepare the work. We
have an intermediate valve which is shut
off - necessary to shut this off, so the man
can work with security on the job. That is
considered a pipefitter's job, and we - I
instruct the pipefitter to shut that valve off.''
(R. 150).
In this connection we again call attention to the fact
that Schenk was present when the work conunenced and
made no effort to have a pipefitter turn off the intermediate valve. He .should have known the intermediate
valve was not turned off because it would only be turned
off pursuant to his orders.
Heywood was unaware of the existence of the intermediate valve (R. 51).
ft is true Crowton \Vas of the opinion that the valve
next to the hammer would be the proper one to shut
off in umking a repair such as was being 1nade by plaintiff. This did not eliminate the testimony concerning
the <·ustmn and practice of turning off the intermediate
valve when "·ork such as that being done by plaintiff
was anticipated.

Plaintiff is not bound by each and Pvery item of
testinwny by each and every witness called on his behalf.
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In Schlatter v. McCarthy (1948) 113 Utah 543, 196
P. (2) 968, this court stated:
"But a party is not bound by every statement that his witness makes, ,and he may, by
testimony of other witne_sses and in argument to
the jury, show that the facts were different from
those testified to by the witness. This is permitted, not for the purpose of impeaching the
witness (although it may have that incidental
effect), but for establishing the true facts. It
would be a monstrous rule that would bind a party
to every statement of every witness produced by
him."
The cases cited by defendant are not in point in
view of the fact plaintiff did not testify that no custom
and practice of turning off the intermediate valve
existed, but only that he was unaware of the existence
of the valve.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS SUBMISSION OF INSTRUCTION NO. 8 TO THE JURY.

The evidence supporting subn1is_sion of Instruction
No. 8 is briefly this. A stemn le.ak was discovered on
the n1orning of the occurrence by Griffiths (R. 87).
Griffiths prompt}~~ notified foren1an Schenk of the leak
(R. 87). Schenk inspected the single arch hannner so he
could "notify the n1an about going out and Inaking repairs.'' He testified:
"Q.

That was so ~?on could detennine whether or
not to send a pipefitter out, or just a
machinist, isn't that right~
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A. In a way, yes." (R. 154).
The leak could have been caused either by a crack
in the piping itself or by loose packing. The only way
to determine which of the.se causes actually existed
was to dismantle the pipe. This was a pipefitter's and
not a machinists job. Schenk decided not to have the
pipefitter dismantle the pipe, but to take a chance and
replace the packing in the hopes that the packing was
the cause of the leak. This was Schenk's decision. Even
after Heywood had commenced the work of replacing
the packing, Schenk returned to the hammer and gave
him a piece of packing which turned out to be the wrong
type. At that time Schenk did not suggest that the pipe
be removed .and inspected. He was content to have Heywood go ahead with the replace1nent of the packing.
Under these circumstances, it became a jury question
whether the railroad should have made the inspection
which would have revealed the cause of the leak. The
following authorities support the giving of Instruction
Xo. 7:
Solonwn R. Co. v. Jones, 30 Kan. 601, 2 P. 657; In
re California Nav. & Imp. Co., 110 Fed. 670; Port of
.V PW York 8teredoring Corporation v. Castagna, 280 Fed.
618; Allen v. Union Pacific R. Co., 7 Ptah 239, 26 P.
:297; Brown v. Sharphottse Contracting Co., 159 Cal. 89,
112 P. 874; Corn Products Refining Co. n. I(ing, 168
Fed. 892; Vew Deemer Mfg. Co. v. ~wells, 296 Fed. 687.

It is interesting to note that defendant cites no
authorities to support its claim that Instruction No. 8
should not have been submitted to the jury.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDI·CIAL
ERROR BY REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1, 8 AND 11.

In Point IY of its brief, defendant expresses di~
satisfaction with the court's instructions No. 9 and 10
on the issue of contributory negligence. Defendant ];.:
not in a position to complain about these instruction~
since it requested they be given and took no exception
to them.
Defendant clai1ns its requested instructions X o. J,
8 and 11 should have been given. Before considering
said requests separately we desire to answer some of the
general contentions n1ade by defendant in its hodge
podge point.

I

In criticizing the Court's instructions X o. 9 and
10, defendant states at page 37 of its brief:
"Neither of said instructions charges the jury
on the theory that plaintiff had a duty to request
and arrange for a pipefitter to inspect the pipe
and to ren1ove the pipe."
It is our position that plaintiff was under no duty
to overrule fore1nan Schenk's decision not to haYe a
pipefitter renwve and inspect the pipe. It is our further
position that nevertheless Instruction K o. 10 includes
the proposition contended for by defendant. Instruction
No. 10 reads in part as follows:
"If yon find fr01n n preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff in perfonuing the
duties of his en1ploy:Inent, and in the exercise of
due care for his own safety, should hare disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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covered the defect in the steam pipe and failed

so to do, then you may find that the pJaintiff was
negligent, etc."
Plaintiff couldn't re1nove the pipe because this was
not a 1nachinist's job. The only way he could have discovered the defect was to request that a pipefitter remove the pipe for an inspection. The jury w.as told by
Instruction No. 10 that they could find plaintiff guilty
of contributory negligence for his failure to make such
a request. It is a well known principle of law that if
a proposition contained in a requested instruction is
adequately instructed upon by the court in another instruction, there is no error in refusal to give such a
request. See Joice v.ll/fissmtri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. (Mis~onri 1945) 189 S.W. 2d 568, 161 ALR 383.
Defendant's requested Instruction No. 1 requires
only a finding that a safe and a dangerous way of performing the work exi.sted and were equally open to the
plaintiff and that he selected the unsafe way, as a basis
for negligence on his part as a matter of law. Whether
plaintiff was aware of the safe w.ay of performing the
work becomes immaterial under the instruction. No requirement that plaintiff did not act as a reasonably pru(lent person under the eirenmstanee~ is imposed by the instnwtion. If he selected a dangerous way and a safe
way was open to him, then he is negligent. The jury
is further authorized to find that such negligence wi.s
the sole proximate cause of his injury.
A party 111a~: sele(•t a dangerous way as distin ..
guished from a safe way of doing work hut, neverthe-
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less, have acted as a reasonably prudent person under
the circumstances. Ka~m~ans v. White Star Gas & Oil
Co., 92 Utah 24, 32, 63 P. 2d 231; Moore v. Miles, 108
Utah 167, 158 P. 2d 676.
A moment's consideration will reveal that for a
workman to choose a less safe course of doing his work
cannot be contributory negligence as a matter of law.
The fundamental rule of contributory negligence is that
a person must use the care that a reasonably prudent
person would use in looking out for his own safet}T· There
are, of course, situations in which the conduct of an
injured person 1nay be such that all reasonable 1nind~
would agree that he did not u_se such care. In that event,
he would be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law. However, the choosing of a way less safe than
another does not require a finding of contributory negligence for the simple reason that a reasonably prudent
person may have chosen a less safe way. This is particularly true under the facts of the case at bar where
plaintiff te_stified that he was unaware of the existence
of the internwdiate Yalve. This proposition of law is
clearly pointed out in BailC'!J 1.'. Prime Trestern Spelter
('o., 83 l{an. 230, 109 P. 791 (1910): See also Bri11kmeier
L llfisso~tri Parific Ry. Co., 69 I'"an. 738. 77 P. 58().

~
1

Futhern10re, defendant's requested Instruction X o.
1 allowed tlw jury to find that plaintiff's negligence
in failing to ~eleet the safe way as distinguished from
the dangerous way. wa~ the sole proxilnate cause of
his injllr~T· lTnder the farts of the rase at bar this 'Yould
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33
have been error. See Tlwmson vs. Boles, 123 F. (2d) 487,
492 (8 C.CA. 1941).
The trial court's Instruction ~ o. 9 left it for the
to consider under general standards of reasonable
care whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent in
not shutting off the intermediate valve and allowed
the jury to determine not only that such was negligence
on the part of plaintiff but that it was the sole proximate
cause of his injury. This instruction allowed defendant
full leeway in arguing contributory negligence to the
jury and, in fact submitted correctly the issue undertaken
to be submitted by defendant's requested Instruction
~ o. 1. Intruction No. 9 was and is a correct statement of
the lav{ and eliminates the erroneous propositions heretofore pointed out that are present in defendant's requested
Instruction ~ o. 1.
jm·~,

Likewise defendant's requested Instruction No. 3
1s erroneous. In the first paragraph of the instruction
it is stated categorically that Heywood had the duty of
exercising reasonable care "in arranging for the shut-off
of the 1naster steam valve in the shop." Plaintiff testified that he wasn't aware of the existence of such a
steam valve in the shop. He was entitled to belief by
the jury on this issue. If he didn't know of the existence
of the stemn valve, certainly he was under no legal
duty to arrange to have it shut off. Yet, requested Instruction ~ o. 8 imposed such a duty upon him as a
matter of law. Clearly the instruction would have been
erroneous if given.
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Defendant's requested Instruction No. 11 is likewise
erroneous. Said instruction reads in part ". . . if you
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff negligently failed to detect a rusted and corroded
condition in the steam pipe, etc. . . . " Said instruction
declares as a matter of law that plaintiff had the duty
of endeavoring to detect the rusted and corroded condition of the steam pipe and then goes on to submit
to the jury the que.stion of whether plaintiff was negligent in performance of said duty. Under the evidence
most favorable to plaintiff, the jury could find that
plaintiff had no duty of inspecting the pipe: that instructions concerning dismantling of the pipe would have
to come fr01n the foren1an, and the work of dismantling
the pipe would have to be done by a pipefitter rather
than by plaintiff. This instruction would clearly have
been error.
As heretofore pointed out the issue was in fact
submitted to the jury by Instruction K o. 10 '\vhich allowed the jury to find that in the exercise of ordinary
care plaintiff should have discovered the defect in tlw
pipe.
POINT V
THE TRIAL ·COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR BY REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 6.

The issue of safe place to work was adequately
and correctly instructed upon in the eourfs Instruction
No. 6 and thP other instructions e1nuner.ated and disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cussed in this hrief under Point I.

It is our position that defendant'.s requested instruction ~ o. 6 would have contributed nothing substantial to
the court's instructions. This can best be pointed out by
considering each of the elernents required by the request.
The first element requires a finding that defendant
knew or should have known of .an unsafe condition or defective equipment. As pointed out by us in Point I, the
extent and nature of the knowledge po.ssessed by defendant railroad company was not an issue in the case. The
railroad cmnpany knew of the leak, was aware of the f.act
that an external inspection would not reveal the cause
of the leak and that in order to discover whether loose
packing or a bre.ak in the pipe was causing the leak, the
pjpe would have to be dismantled. It is undisputed that
removal and inspertion of the pipe would have revealed
the eause of the leak. The facts being undisputed the
question to he resolved by the jury was whether in
,·iew of such facts the railroad company by directing
plaintiff to rerno·ve and replaee the packing, exereised ordinary eare in furnishing hiln with a reasonah1y safe place in which to work. Defendant's requested
instruction X o. 6 would have subrnitted to the jury issues
that were not in dispute. Consequently, the manner
adopted hy the trial court in subrnitting the issue of safe
place to vYork to the jury was less apt to be misunderstood by the jury than would have been defendant's re(lUested instruction No. 6. We have heretofore distint,ruished the Horton, Dixon, Hatfield, Burks and Stevens
cases. Those cases contained mandatory instructions re-
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moving from the jury the issue of whether defendant had
exerci;:;ed reasonable care in furnishing a reasonably safe
place to work.
The second element in defendant's requested instruction No. 6 that the railroad before being liable should in
the exercise of reasonable care have known that the unsafe condition gave rise to an unreasonable risk of harm,
is included in instruction No. 6 where the Court requires
as a condition to recovery that "Defendant failed to exercise reasonable care to make .said place reasonably safe
for the performance of such duties in that the position of
the plaintiff in connection with his duties and the operation of appliances used in the performance of his duties,
were such that the plaintiff was not perfonning his duties
in a place of reasonable safety, etc." If the jury found, as
it mu.st, in order to allow recovery for plaintiff, that he
was not in a position of reasonable safety, then of course,
the jury was finding that he was subjected to an unreasonable risk of harm. These are n1erely hYo different
w.ays of stating the same thing.
The third sub-section of requested instruction Xo. 6
requires that the railroad had a "sufficient period of tune
within which to correct said unsafe condition, etc ... lTnder
the undisputed facts of the case the leak was discovered
and repoded to ~ehenk. He it was who decided whether
to have a Inachini~t replace the packing or a pipefitter
renwve and in~pt>et the piping. The ti1ne ele1nent was not
an issue. The i~~lH' had to do with the decision n1ade by
S<·I1Pnk at the time he inspected the leak. The railroad
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37

had sufficient time to correct the unsafe condition simply
by sending a pipefitter to remove the pipe and inspect it.
The r.ailroad didn't do this. The length of time had by
the railroad within which to correct the unsafe condition
was not a disputed issue. Also to permit recovery only
in the event defendant did not have time to fix the pipe
would eliminate recovery for negligence in permitting
plaintiff to work there after defendant had discovered the
dangerous condition. It should not only fix the condition
but until fixed should take steps to protect persons from
the danger.
The fourth requirement of the requested instruction
that the unsafe condition was .a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, of course, was submitted correctly in the
court's Instruction No. 6.
The trial court did not commit error in refusing to
give said instruction.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL ·COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR BY REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2.

Defendant's requested Instruction No. 2 is set forth
as follows for the convenience of the Court:
"You .are instructed that a Railroad Company
is not required to adopt extraordinary or unreasonable tests or examinations to discover defects
in machinery, but fulfills its duty if it adopts such
tests and examination procedure as are ordinarily
used by prudently conducted Railroads under like
ci reu1nstances. ''
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Plaintiff Inade no contention that the railroad COlllpany was required to adopt extraordinary or unreasonable tests or examinations to discover defects in machinery. Under Moore v. Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad Company, 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P. 2d 849 (1956)
extraneous issues not raised by the pleadings or by the
parties should not be submitted to the jury. See also
Pollard v. Gammon ( Ua. 1940), 63 Ga. App. 852, 1~ S.E.
2d 624.
The last portion of requested instruction X o. 2, in
our opinion is erroneous where it states: "But fulfills its
duty if it adopts such tests and examination procedure a~
are ordinarily u.sed by prudently conducted Railroads
under like circumstances." The issue is not what is ordinarily done by prudently conducted railroads, because prudently conducted railroads n1ight ordinarily perform
work in a negligent manner under certain circumstances.
The test is that of ordinary care under the circun1stances
.and the tribunal to detern1ine this issue is the jury. As
was said by l\[r. Justice Hohnes in T.e.ras and Pacific
Railu·ay Co. r. Bel1ymer, 189 r.~. 468, 23 ~. Ct. 62~.
47 LEd 905:
"What usually is done Inay be evidence of
what ought to be done, but what ought to be done,
is fixed by a standard of re.asonable prudence,
whether it usually is co1nplied with or not. TVabash R. Co. L illcDaniels. 107 r. s. -!5-t. 27 L. Ed
605, 2 Supp. Ct. Rep 932. ··
See 68 ALR 1400, 1-!-!5, Annotation entitled .. Custom
as a Standard of Care, .. "·here it is said:
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·• Where the safety of en1ployees i.s dependent
npon the employer Inaking reasonable tests or inspections of equipment, the quite general rule is
that general practice is not a 1neasure of the c.are
required."
~ee

also International & G.Y.B. Co., v. Hawes (1899;
Tex Civ. App) 54 S.W. 325; Jlfidland Valley R. Co. r.
Bell (1917) 155 C.C.A. 391, 242 Fed. 803 (Certiorari denie<l in (1917) :245 U.S. 653, 62 L. Ed. :132, 38 S. Ct. 1:2).
Another defect in the requested instruction i.s that
no evidence was introduced by defendant as to the tests
and procedures ordinarily used by prudently conducted
railroads under like circumstances. Therefore it goes
without saying that an instruction on the subject would
have been error.
POINT VII
THE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE WERE FOR THE JURY: THE TRIAL COURT
CORRECTLY AND JUSTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.

A brief review of the facts nwst favorable to plaintiff indicate that this was a case peeuliarly for the jury.
The evidence revealed that a steam leak had developed
in a stuffing box. The leak was caused either by loose
packing or by a crack or break in the pipe within the
stuffing box . .\ visual inspection would not reveal which
of the two possible cau.ses existed. If the packing within
the box was to he replaced a machinist would be assigned
to perforrn the work. If the pipe w.as to he removed and
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inspected, a pipefitter would be given the assignment.
Foreman Schenk made a visual inspection and decided
that he would take a chance and have Heywood replace
the packing. This failure to remove the pipe .and make
an inspection which would have revealed the exact cause
of the leak created the situation out of which liability on
the part of defendant arises. Clearly there was an evidentiary basis for a finding that no proper and adequate
inspection was made by defendant prior to assigning
plaintiff the task of replacing the packing. Likewise, a
jury question was presented as to whether the railroad
was negligent through its foreman Schenk in not sending
.a pipefitter to turn off the intermediate valve before requiring plaintiff to replace the packing. Schenk knew
when plaintiff was going to perform this 'vork. He was
at the steam hammer at the commencement of the work.
He knew the situation with respect to the presence or absence of steam in the line, or so a jury could find, and he
did not take proper steps to turn the steam out of the line
at the intermediate valve. A jury question was like"\\ise
presented with respect to whether or not defendant had
exercised reasonable care in providing plaintiff "ith a
rea.sonably safe place to work. Plaintiff was required to
1nount a ladder approxi1nately ten feet in the air and to
work at the stuffing box. The jury could well have found
that plaintiff was .also required to turn the valve at the
stuffing box back on to test the adequacy of the stuffing
before moving fr01n the ladder. Not only the physical
factors present n1ust be considered in detennining
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whether a reasonably safe place to work has been provided for plaintiff, but the conduct of his fellow employees .and of his supervisors.
Perhaps the leading case under the Federal Employers' Liability Act on the matter of safe place to work is
Bailey ~ 1 • Central Vermont Ry. Inc., 319 U. S. 350, 63 S.
Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444, where Mr. Justice Douglas,
speaking for the court stated:
"The nature of the task which Bailey undertook, the hazards which it entailed, the effort
which it required, the kind of footing he had, the
space in which he could stand, the absence of a
guard rail, the height of the bridge above the
ground, the fact that the car could have been
opened or unloaded near the bridge on level
ground-all these were facts .and circumstances
for the jury to weigh and appraise in determining
whether respondent in furnishing Bailey with that
particular place in which to perform the task was
negligent. The debatable quality of that issue, the
f.act that fair-minded men might reach different
conclusions, emphasize the appropriateness of
leaving the question to the jury. The jury is the
tribunal under our legal system to decide that
type of is.sue (Tiller v. Atlantic Coast LineR. Co.,
supra) as well as issues involving controverted
evidence. Jones v. East Tennessee, V. G. R. Co.,
128 C. S. 443, 445, 9 S. Ct. 118, 32 L. Ed. 478 ;
Washington & G. R. Co. v. McDade, 135 U.S. 554,
572, 10 S. Ct. 1044, 1049, 34 L. Ed. 235. To withdraw such .a question fron1 the jury is to usurp its
functions.
c~t.

See also Wilkerson v. Jl ce ar ll1 y, 336 P. S. 53, 69 S.
-±13, 93 L. Ed. 497.
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Defendant state·s at page 44 of its brief:
"The failure to correct the condition was negligence on the part of plaintiff. Plaintiff was in
the best possible position to ascertain the trouble
and appreciate the danger. Plaintiff took it upon
himself to turn the steam without having corrected or repaired the defect."
The issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence in
the foregoing regard was properly left to the jury under
Instructions K o. 9 and 10 and ·was resolved against defendant. Not content, counsel for defendant now undertakes
a reargument of the facts. vYe detect once again an effort to revive the doctrine of assumption of risk abolished
by the 1939 amendment . A late denunciation of this procedure is found in Thomas 1/. Union Railway Company,
(6th circuit 1954) 216 F 2d 18.
See also Atlantic Coast LineR. Co. r. Burkett, (5th
circuit 1951) 192 F 2d 941.
We submit that the issues of negligence and contributory negligence were peculiarly for the jury under the
facts of this case and that the trial court correctly and
justly denied defendanfs nwtion for .a directed verdict.
CONCLU~IOX

In conclusion we call attention to the following significant statmnent in Southern Pacific Company r. Guthrie (9th circuit 1949) 180 F. 2d 295:
"Perhaps son1e of the abstract propositions
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:structions asked for, based on the facts a.ssumed
herein, if such f.acts were conceded, or found in a
special verdict, would be technically correct. But
a judge is not bound to charge upon assumed facts
in the ipsissima verba of counsel, nor to give categorical answers to a juridical catechism based on
such assumption. Such .a course would often mislead the jury instead of enlightening them, and is
calculated rather to involve the case in the meshes
of technicality, than to promote the ends of law
and justice. It belongs to the judicial office to
exercise discretion as to the style and form in
which to expound the law .and comment upon the
facts. If a judge states that law incorrectly, or
refuses to state it at all, on a point material to the
issue, the party aggrieved will be entitled to a
new trial. But when he explains the whole law
applicable to the case in hand, as we think was
done in this case, he cannot be called upon to expres.s it in the categorical form based upon assuined facts, which counsel choose to present to

hun."
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the issues were
properly and adequately submitted to the jury by the
trial court's instructions and that the jur:v's verdict
should be affinned.
Respectfully sub1nitted,
RAWLINGS, \V.ALLAl
ROBJ1~RTS & BLACK:

1

1j~'

By WAYNE L. BLACK,
Co'ltnsel for Respondent
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